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I. INTRODUCTION
The Technology Transfer Block Exemption, Regulation 240/96
("TTBE"), 1 which sets out the E.U. competition rules applicable to patent
and know-how licensing agreements, was described by Alexander Schaub,
former Director General of the European Commission's DG Competition,
as a "dinosaur awaiting extinction.",
2
The TTBE is the last of the mainstream E.U. block exemption
regulations to apply a formalistic and rigid exemption approach according
to which all restraints are presumed to be illegal unless expressly permitted
by the block exemption or notified to the Commission for individual
clearance. Arbitrary duration limits on the grant of territorial exclusivity,
uncertainty as to whether licenses without territorial exclusivity are
covered, and the prohibition of non-compete, tying and certain grant back
clauses, are just a few examples of the limitations of the TTBE.
In December 2001, the Commission published an Evaluation Report3
in which it openly admitted the shortcomings of the current TTBE and
promised a radical, more liberal, economics-based approach to technology
* Fiona Carlin, Partner, Baker & McKenzie, European Law Centre (Brussels).
** Stephanie Pautke, Associate, Baker & McKenzie (Frankfurt).
Commission Regulation 240/96 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2 [hereinafter
TTBE].
2 Alexander Schaub, Remarks at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's 28th Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 2001).
3 Commission Evaluation Report on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption
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transfer in line with the recent revisions of other major block exemptions. 4
Nearly two years later, on October 1, 2003, the Commission published
a formal proposal for a new technology transfer block exemption ("Draft
TTBE") together with detailed draft guidelines ("Draft Guidelines") 5 which
explain how the new regulation will be interpreted and how Article 81 will
be applied to agreements that fall outside the revised regulation's safe
harbor. These proposals unleashed a barrage of criticism from industry and
seem likely to result in some amendments to the proposed texts before their
adoption in March or April 2004. The new package is due to enter into
force on May 1, 2004.
Although the TTBE is not due to expire until March 31, 2006, this
precipitated review process is designed to coincide with the entry into force
on May 1, 2004, of Regulation 1/2003.6 Regulation 1/2003 will radically
reform the system of competition law enforcement in Europe by
abandoning the Commission's long-standing monopoly on granting
exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) and encouraging a network of national
competition authorities and courts in an extended European Union of 25
Member States to apply the E.U. competition rules directly and in their
entirety. This broader reform means that where an agreement falls outside a
block exemption it is no longer possible to notify the agreement to the
Commission for individual exemption to ensure its enforceability. Instead,
parties will have to continuously assess whether their agreement still
satisfies the cumulative exemption criteria set out in Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty, an exercise fraught with inherent uncertainty.
It is against this background that the Commission's TTBE proposals of
October 2003 have been criticized as too rigid and difficult to apply in
practice.
After a brief introduction to the current TTBE, this article discusses
the Commission's proposals for reform as published in October 2003. We
indicate the major changes that are likely to be introduced to this package as
envisaged in a revised text circulated by the Commission to the Member
States in January 2004 but which, regrettably, will not be made publicly
4 See Commission Regulation 2790/1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21;
Commission Regulation 2658/2000 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Specialization Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304) 3; Commission Regulation
2659/2000 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and
Development Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304) 7.
5 Draft Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2003 O.J. (C 235) 11 [hereinafter Draft
TTBE]; Draft Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology
Transfer Agreements, 2003 O.J. (C 235) 17 [hereinafter Draft Guidelines].
6 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid
Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
24:601 (2004)
available for further consultation. Although the final package may be
subject to further amendment before it is finally adopted, it is encouraging
that the Commission seems to have taken on board many of the industry's
concerns and is currently envisaging a more flexible regulatory
environment than was originally foreseen.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits all agreements between
companies which have as their object or effect the restriction, prevention or
distortion of competition within the European Union and which are capable
of appreciably affecting trade between E.U. Member States. Restrictive
agreements within the meaning of Article 81 (1) are automatically void, and
therefore unenforceable, by virtue of Article 81(2), subject only to national
principles of severability. Infringements of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty
may also result in the imposition of fines of up to ten percent of a
company's worldwide aggregate annual turnover and, in certain
circumstances, private actions for damages by those who consider that they
have been harmed by the anti-competitive agreement.
The prohibition contained in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty is not
absolute. Restrictive agreements will be valid and enforceable if they
satisfy the exemption criteria of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. An
exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty will be granted if, broadly
speaking, the pro-competitive advantages of an agreement outweigh its anti-
competitive effects.
Compliance with the conditions set out in a Commission block
exemption regulation means that an agreement will automatically be
deemed to satisfy the Article 81(3) criteria and thus is exempt from the
Article 81(1) prohibition. The benefit of a block exemption may be
withdrawal from a specific agreement or category of agreements where
there is insufficient competition in a market, but withdrawal is not
retroactive and has not occurred to date.
Since the Commission is not only abolishing the individual exemption
procedure as part of its Regulation 1/2003 modernization drive, but is also
proposing a much stricter approach as to how the new network of
enforcement authorities should interpret Article 81(3),7 companies are
likely to increasingly rely on the block exemption safe harbors as a
guarantee of legal certainty.
7 See Commission Draft Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty,
2003 O.J. (C 243) 62. As currently drafted, these Guidelines will impose a much higher, and
in the authors' view, unrealistic burden of proof on companies seeking to rely on Article
81(3) by essentially requiring them to substantiate and quantify objective efficiencies likely
to arise from their agreement and to demonstrate consumer pass-on benefits.
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III. SCOPE OF THE CURRENT TTBE
The TTBE covers two-party patent and/or know-how license
agreements, "in particular" for purposes of manufacturing, use or putting on
the market.8 Agreements licensing intellectual property ("IP") rights other
than patents or know-how (in particular, trademarks, design rights and
copyright including software protection) cannot benefit from the current
TTBE unless those rights are ancillary to the main patent/know-how
license. Agreements which have as their main object the sale or purchase of
goods are not covered by the TTBE but are dealt with under the vertical
regime. 9
The TTBE contains a detailed list of white clauses (i.e.,
unconditionally exempted/permitted clauses, most of which usually do not
violate Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty), black clauses (i.e., prohibited
clauses, the inclusion of which brings the entire agreement outside the
scope of the block exemption) and gray clauses (i.e., potentially exemptible
clauses but which require a case-by-case analysis). For the latter category,
the TTBE provides for an "opposition procedure" whereby if the
Commission does not oppose the application of the block exemption within
a period of four months after the clauses in question have been notified to it,
the TTBE is deemed to apply. Restrictions not expressly covered by either
the white or black list are treated as "gray" clauses.
The TTBE only applies to those patent/know-how license agreements
which contain one or more of the obligations listed in Article 1 (1). The first
six of these obligations involve territorial limitations on the license being
granted and exclusivity as between the licensor and licensee and/or between
licensees. Unless the agreement provides for an obligation on the licensee
to use only the licensor's trademark 0 or an output limitation to only
manufacture the licensed products for the licensee's own products," the
inclusion of such restraints is required to ensure the availability of the block
exemption in the first place. While the type of licenses to which the TTBE
applies includes those containing "obligations of the types referred to in
[Article 1(1)] but with a more limited scope than is permitted by [it],"'2 it
has never been clear whether this would be sufficient for the TTBE to apply
if none of the obligations in Article 1 is expressly included in the
agreement. This has had the counterintuitive effect of ensuring that licenses
contain territorial restrictions regardless of whether this was a commercial
priority of either the licensor or licensee.
8 TTBE, supra note 1, at recital 5.
9 See Regulation 2790 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, supra note 4.
10 TTBE, supra note 1, at art. 1(1)(7).
"I d. at art. 1(1)(8).
12 Id. at art. 1(5) (emphasis added).
Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
24:601 (2004)
Another major weakness is the imposition of arbitrary duration limits.
Territorial exclusivity is permitted in a pure patent license only for as long
as parallel patents remain in force in the territories concerned. Territorial
exclusivity in a pure know-how license is permitted only for a period of ten
years from the first sale of the product in question in the European Union
by any licensee, regardless of whether the know-how remains secret and
valuable thereafter or has been complemented by additional know-how in
the interim. 14
The current TTBE does not distinguish between agreements concluded
between competitors or non-competitors: both are assessed according to
the same lists of white, black 15 and gray clauses. Market shares of the
contract parties are relevant only in the context of joint venture
agreements 16 and to the extent that the Commission can, in theory,
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption where the licensee's market
share exceeds forty percent. 17
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE DRAFT TTBE
A. Revised Exemption Scheme
In line with the Commission's general policy of introducing more
economic analysis when applying the block exemption regulations, the
Draft TTBE follows the modern and less formalistic "umbrella style"
exemption scheme according to which, within certain market share
thresholds, all restraints which are not expressly prohibited are permitted.18
Instead of the detailed catalogues of white, black and gray clauses, the
Draft TTBE contains a shortened list of stringently prohibited restrictions,
the inclusion of which brings the entire agreement outside the scope of the
block exemption. The Draft TTBE also provides for a limited list of
restraints which are not covered by the block exemption, but which do not
affect its applicability to the remainder of the agreement. The opposition
13 Id. at art. 1(2).
14 Id. at art. 1(3).
15 Except that customer restrictions in licenses between competitors are prohibited.
16 See TTBE, supra note 1, at art. 5(2)(1) (restricting the block exemption when
technology transfer agreements are made between a parent entity and a joint venture to cases
in which the participating companies do not exceed a twenty percent market-share threshold
in the case of a license limited to production, or a ten percent market-share threshold in the
case of a license covering production and distribution).
1" Id. at art. 7(1).
18 For example, under this new approach tying and non-compete clauses in relation to
distribution activities are no longer expressly mentioned by the Draft TTBE and will thus be
exempted within the respective market-share thresholds. The current TTBE does not exempt
such clauses. See id. at art. 4(2) (treating tying clauses as gray clauses); id at art. 3(2) (black-
listing non-compete clauses).
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procedure will be abolished.
The new approach is characterized by two major structural changes
with far-reaching practical consequences: (i) the distinction between
agreements between competitors, and agreements between non-competitors,
and (ii) the introduction of market share thresholds.
1. Distinction between Agreements between Competitors and Non-
Competitors
This distinction is of significant practical importance for the
structuring of licensing agreements. As explained below, restraints in
agreements between competitors will be subject to lower market share
thresholds and a longer list of hardcore restrictions, while agreements
between non-competitors will be treated more leniently.
In assessing the competitive relationship between the parties to a
licensing agreement, it will be necessary to examine two markets: the
product market and the technology market. In the relevant product market,
the question is the traditional one as to whether the parties are actual or
realistic potential competitors. A welcome, more practical approach is
proposed in relation to the relevant technology market where the
Commission will only examine whether the parties are actual competitors,
i.e., whether they actually license competing technologies. In calculating
the licensor's share of the relevant technology market, the Commission will
look at the share that the technology represents of the downstream product
market (taking into account the combined production of the licensor and its
licensees) rather than trying to calculate the licensor's royalty income on
the relevant technology licensing market.' 9
The Commission helpfully states in its Draft Guidelines that parties
will not be considered to be competitors if their technologies are in a one-
way or two-way blocking position. However, such a finding will require
"[p]articularly convincing evidence" that a blocking position exists such as
a final court decision on the matter or the opinion of independent experts.2)
The implication that companies should choose to litigate rather than settle
in order to benefit from the more liberal rules applied to non-competitors
has been criticized as unrealistic and unnecessarily formalistic, especially
for certain industrial sectors including IT and pharmaceuticals where such
disputes are frequent occurrences. The Commission has indicated in
January 2004 that it may be prepared to accept other "convincing"
evidence, including expert evidence from the parties themselves.
In its 2001 Evaluation Report, the Commission suggested that where
one competitor introduces a "drastic innovation" to the market (e.g., the CD
19 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 3(3).
20 Draft Guidelines, supra note 5, at para. 25.
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player replacing the LP technology), the innovator's licenses of the
breakthrough technology to its existing competitors would benefit from the
more liberal regime applicable to non-competitors.2' However, at
Paragraph 26 of the Draft Guidelines, the Commission states that, at the
time of the license, it is often not possible to conclude that the new
technology already constitutes a separate new market: any such
development can usually only be concluded from an ex post perspective.
This would mean that in order to benefit from the block exemption, the
parties would be constrained at the outset by the considerably stricter rules
governing agreements between competitors, but could at some point in the
future adapt their license to reflect the more generous rules applicable to
non-competitors. In the authors' view, if the parties reasonably believed at
the outset that the licensed technology was likely to amount to a "drastic
innovation" in the short-term and chose to avail themselves of some of the
restrictions that are only permitted in agreements between non-competitors,
they should not be unduly penalized by a competition authority
subsequently substituting its own ex post assessment for the parties' good
faith ex ante judgment.
As of January 2004, the Commission appears willing to accept that
where parties become competitors after the conclusion of the agreement
because, for example the licensee goes on to develop a competing
technology, the stricter rules governing relationships between competitors
will not be applied unless the agreement is subsequently altered or
amended.
2. Introduction of Market-Share Thresholds
One of the more controversial aspects of the Commission's proposals
is the introduction of market share thresholds. The Draft TTBE will apply
to agreements between competitors where their combined market share
either on a relevant technology or on a relevant product market does not
exceed twenty percent.22 At only twice the de-minimis level, 23 this will
mean that many existing agreements between competitors will no longer be
covered by the revised TTBE. Non-competing parties will benefit from the
revised Regulation if they each have a share not exceeding thirty percent in
the relevant technology and product markets.24 If the parties initially fall
under the block exemption regulation but later exceed the market share
thresholds, they will retain the benefit of a block exemption for another two
21 Evaluation Report, supra note 3, at para. 125.
22 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 3(1).
23 Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance which do not Appreciably
Restrict Competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty, 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13.
24 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 3(2).
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years.
25
While the introduction of market shares is in line with the
Commission's approach to introduce more economic criteria to the
application of block exemption regulations generally, in the context of
licensing agreements, market share thresholds can be notoriously difficult
to apply in practice.
Market shares are often an inappropriate and somewhat arbitrary
indicator of the competitive situation and future dynamics of innovative
markets: apart from the difficulties inherent defining the appropriate
relevant markets, in particular with respect to new technologies, market
shares cannot appropriately reflect future developments and in particular the
significant impact of potential competition. In January 2004, the
Commission has somewhat helpfully indicated that outside the block
exemption safe harbor, it will normally take the view that in the absence of
hardcore restrictions, Article 81 is unlikely to be infringed where there exist
four or more independently controlled technologies that may be
substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user.
In this regard, the U.S. approach as reflected in the Federal Trade
Commission's 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, which focuses on the remaining independent poles of research as
opposed to readily available substitutes, seems more appropriate.
Industry representatives have vociferously objected to the
Commission's plans to subject agreements between non-competing parties
to a requirement that they each have a market share not exceeding thirty
percent. If a right holder has the right not to license its technology in the
first place, then limited licenses should generally be acceptable absent
significant market power and very particular circumstances which clearly
indicate that a given license is appreciably reducing competition in the
market: the withdrawal mechanism and Article 82 of the EC Treaty which
prohibits the abuse of dominance ought to be sufficient to cover such
eventualities. The Commission, however, seems unlikely to waver on this
issue.
B. Broader Scope of the Draft TTBE
The scope of the new Regulation will be broader than the current
TTBE in that it will cover not only patent and/or know-how licensing
agreements, but also software copyright licensing agreements.26 There is a
proviso that the primary object of any license agreement should relate to the
manufacture or provision of the contract products/services. It is unclear
how the Commission will interpret the "manufacturing" requirement in the
25 Id. at art. 8(2).
26 Id. at art. I(b).
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context of software agreements. A narrow interpretation could potentially
exclude a large number of software agreements from the block exemption,
such as word processing software used by professionals or utilization
restraints in the form of CPU, upgrade or original equipment manufacturer
("OEM") clauses. The Draft TTBE does not provide for the inclusion of
other IP rights such as trademarks: they will be covered by the Draft TTBE
only to the extent that they are ancillary to the primary object of the
agreement and are directly related to the manufacture or provision of the
contract products.27
In its Draft Guidelines, the Commission is proposing to exclude non-
assertion and settlement agreements from the scope of the revised
Regulation on the grounds that their primary object is not the
manufacture/provision of products. 28  This carve-out is particularly
unfortunate in those sectors where patent thickets are common. Non-
assertion and settlement agreements allow companies to carry on their
business in the knowledge that their investments will not be threatened by
litigation. There is no obvious reason to exclude them from the block
exemption safe harbor. The Commission seems to have accepted this view
and, as of January 2004, is prepared to include in the TTBE safe harbor
non-assertion and settlement agreements whereby the licensor permits the
licensee to produce within the scope of its patent.
There are a number of other limitations on the scope of the Draft
TTBE. For example, the definition of "know-how ' 29 requires that the
know-how be "indispensable" for the manufacture/provision of the contract
products. The current TTBE merely requires that the know-how be
"useful., 30 The Commission has since indicated that it is prepared to revert
to this lower "useful" standard.
Also, the Draft Guidelines would exclude from the new rules
technology licensed for the purposes of enabling the licensee to carry out
research and development ("R&D") for his own account for later
exploitation. 1 It is not clear why such arrangements should be excluded if
they are designed to assist the licensee in bringing new products to the
market, for as long as they fall outside the ambit of the Commission's R&D
block exemption. As of January 2004, the Commission seems willing to
accept that the Draft TTBE should also apply to agreements whereby the
licensee must carry out further development before obtaining a product or
process that is ready for commercial exploitation, for as long as a contract
product has been identified up-front.
" Id at art. 1(b).
28 Draft Guidelines, supra note 5, at para. 35.
29 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 1(g).
30 TTBE, supra note 1, at art. 10(3).
31 Draft Guidelines, supra note 5, at para. 41.
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C. Hardcore Restraints under the Draft TTBE
Article 4 of the Draft TTBE contains an extensive list of prohibited
restraints the inclusion of which will take the entire agreement outside the
safe harbor.
1. Hardcore Restraints in Agreements between Competitors
a. Price-Fixing (Draft TTBE, Article 4(1)(a))
Article 4(1)(a) of the Draft TTBE contains an uncontroversial
prohibition of downstream price-fixing.32 However, at Paragraph 77 of the
Draft Guidelines, the Commission states that in the context of cross-
licensing between competitors, royalty obligations calculated on the basis
of individual product sales may amount to price-fixing and thus constitute a
hardcore restriction of competition unless the parties can demonstrate that
their agreement leads to a "significant integration of complementary
technologies," and that they could not have chosen a less restrictive
payment scheme such as lump sum payments.33 This disregards the fact
that running royalties are often the only economically feasible way to
establish the price for a technology license and thus encourage the
dissemination of the technology in the first place, in particular where the
commercial success of a technology is unforeseeable at the outset. As of
January 2004, the Commission appears willing to accept this reasoning and
has indicated that it will be suspicious of running royalties only where the
agreement is devoid of any pro-competitive purpose and does not constitute
a bonafide licensing agreement.
The Commission's expansive ability to foresee price-fixing continues
at Paragraph 199 of the Draft Guidelines where it assumes that royalty and
other payment schemes concluded in the context of settlement and non-
assertion agreements will encourage price coordination unless such
agreements are royalty free or provide for a one-off lump sum royalty.34 As
of January 2004, the Commission seems likely to abandon this approach
which would undermine the parties' ability to settle patent infringement
suits where parties are often unable to predict let alone agree on the relative
value of their respective rights over time.
b. Output Restraints (Draft TTBE, Art 4 (1)(b))
Article 4(1)(b) of the Draft TTBE prohibits "the limitation of output or
sales, except limitations on the output of contract products imposed on the
32 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 4(1)(a).
33 Id. at para. 77 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at para. 199.
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licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement. 3 5 This carve-out of non-reciprocal
restraints is less helpful than it appears since such restraints are excluded
from the scope of the Draft TTBE by virtue of Article 5(2) and fall to be
individually assessed in accordance with Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
As of January 2004, the Commission seems willing to accept that also
output restraints in reciprocal agreements between competitors are block
exempted if only imposed on one licensee. It is also proposing to delete
Article 5(2) so that such restraints will fall squarely within the block
exemption safe harbor.
c. Territorial and Customer Restraints (Draft TTBE, Article 4(1)(c))
Article 4(l)(c) of the Draft TTBE prohibits the allocation of markets or
customers between competitors except for:
(i) an obligation on the licensee in a non-reciprocal agreement to
exploit the licensed technology only within one or more
technical fields of use of one or more product markets, or
(ii) a requirement that the licensee manufactures or provides the
contract products only for its own use.
36
Under the Draft TTBE, therefore, all territorial restraints in agreements
between competitors which restrict the freedom of the licensor will hence
be considered as hardcore violations of Article 81(1). Only sole licenses
where the licensor remains free to use but agrees to grant no other licenses
are covered by the block exemption. This is a drastic change with far-
reaching consequences for existing agreements between competitors: under
the existing TTBE, territorial restraints binding both licensor and licensee
are commonplace. At Paragraph 80 of the Draft Guidelines, the
Commission argues that it is not appropriate to block exempt output
restrictions on the licensor on the basis that "when a licensee is willing to
accept a one way restriction, it is likely that the agreement leads to a real
integration of complementary technologies or an efficiency enhancing
integration of the licensor's superior technology with the licensee's product
assets." Arguably, there is no reason to prohibit output restraints on the
licensor provided the licensee is free to exploit its own technology without
limitation. The proposed approach would prevent the licensor from
agreeing not to use its own technology in a territory or field of use granted
to the licensee.
Similarly, provided the parties are free to use their existing technology,
reciprocal field of use restraints between competitors may not be restrictive
and indeed may be necessary to encourage licensing in the first place. Field
of use restrictions usually reflect the different technological focus of the
35 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 4(1)(b).
36 Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
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parties, but they may also be agreed on for monetary reasons where one
party is not prepared to compensate the other for the technology covering a
broad field of application. Reciprocal field of use restraints are frequently
used to settle patent litigation. It therefore appears overly severe to
consider reciprocal field of use restrictions as per se illegal, particularly if
there is sufficient inter-brand competition in the market.
As of January 2004, the Commission has apparently accepted that the
hardcore list in relation to field-of-use, territorial, and customer restraints
was too rigid and seems prepared to introduce significant changes by
permitting both field-of-use restraints in cross licensing between
competitors, as well as a field-of-use restraint on the licensor where
exclusivity in the field is granted to the licensee and territorial and customer
restrictions agreed between licensor and licensee in a non-reciprocal
agreement. This will allow the parties to allocate exclusive territories
between them and restrict active and passive sales into each others'
territories. In addition, the revised proposal exempts the restriction of
active sales into exclusively allocated territories of other licensees.
d. Restraints on R&D and the Exploitation of Own Technologies (Draft
TTBE, Article 4(1)(d))
Article 4(1)(d) of the Draft TTBE prohibits any restriction on the
licensee's ability to exploit its own technology or the restriction of the
ability of either party to carry out independent R&D unless this restraint is
"indispensable" to prevent the disclosure of licensed know-how to third
parties.37  The proposed changes lead to more flexibility than currently
provided for under the existing TTBE, according to which all non-compete
obligations are considered hardcore restraints regardless of whether they
relate to distribution, production or R&D activities.38 Under the Draft
TTBE, restraints on the licensee's ability to exploit competing third party
technologies would now be exempted below the market share threshold of
twenty percent.
2. Hardcore Restraints in Agreements between Non-Competitors
a. Price Fixing (Draft TTBE, Article 4(2)(a))
Article 4(2)(a) of the Draft TTBE prohibits downstream price-fixing,
but, in contrast to the approach adopted in relation to agreements between
competitors, it expressly permits the licensor to impose maximum sales
prices or recommended sales prices.39
31 Id. at art. 4(1)(d).
38 TTBE, supra note 1, at art. 3(2).
39 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 4(2)(a).
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b. Territorial and Customer Restraints (Draft TTBE, Article 4(2)(b))
Article 4(2)(b) prohibits restrictions of the territory into which or of
the customers to whom, the licensee may sell, except:
(i) sales where the territory/customer group is exclusively reserved
to the licensor;
(ii) active sales into territories/customer groups which are
exclusively reserved to another licensee;
(iii) a requirement that the licensee manufactures or provides the
contract products only for its own use;
(iv) restrictions of sales to end users by a licensee operating the
wholesale level; and
(v) restrictions of sales to unauthorized distributors by the
members of a selective distribution system.4 °
Article 4(2) of the Draft TTBE follows the Commission's approach
regarding the assessment of territorial and customer restraints 4 1 under the
vertical restraints block exemption, with the exception that the licensor can
prevent its licensees from actively but also from passively selling into
42territories/customer groups reserved exclusively for sales by the licensor.
The current TTBE permits restraints on passive sales to territories of
other licensees for a period of five years from first introducing the product
on the market.4 3 According to the Draft TTBE, active, but not passive sales,
can be restricted amongst licensees who have been awarded exclusive
territories/customer groups.44  However, Paragraph 93 of the Draft
Guidelines recognizes that passive sales restrictions for two years from
when the contract product incorporating the licensed technology is first put
on the market often fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty
in the first place as a necessary incentive for the licensee to take on the
often substantial risks and investments associated with the license. It is
misleading that the Draft TTBE blacklists a clause that for this two year
period is assumed not to infringe Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty.
As of January 2004, the Commission seems to be prepared to
41 Id. art. 4(2)(b).
41 Customer restraints in agreements between non-competitors are treated as gray clauses
under the current TTBE which means that they benefit from the block exemption only after
notification under the opposition procedure. Id. at recital 23; Evaluation Report, supra note
3, at para. 19.
42 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art., 4(2)(b)(i). The Draft TTBE does not define active
and passive sales. However, according to Paragraph 50 of the Guidelines on Vertical
Agreements, active sales mean "actively approaching customers inside another distributor's
exclusive territory or exclusive customer group" and passive sales mean "responding to
unsolicited request from individual customers."
43 TTBE, supra note 1, at art. l(l)(6), 1(3).
44 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 4(2)(b)(ii).
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expressly block exempt all restrictions on active and passive sales imposed
on the licensor, all active sales restrictions imposed on the licensee, and
passive sales by licensees into the exclusive territory or to the exclusive
customer group allocated to another licensee for a period of two years.
c. Customer Restraints in Selective Distribution Systems (Draft TTBE,
Article 4(2)(c))
In agreements between non-competitors, Article 4(2)(c) of the Draft
TTBE prohibits restrictions on sales to end users by licensees which are
members of a selective distribution system operating at the retail level.45
However, location clauses are permitted: the licensor may prohibit its
licensees from operating out of an unauthorized place of establishment.
This hardcore restraint mirrors Article 4(c) of the vertical restraints block
exemption. Selective distribution systems are not expressly mentioned in
the current TTBE.
D. Other Significant Changes
1. Longer Duration
The draft Regulation will apply for as long as the last intellectual
property right remains valid.4 6 This is a significant improvement over the
arbitrary duration limits in the current TTBE.
2. Multi-Party Agreements Excluded
Extending the scope of the block exemption to cover agreements
between more than two parties would have required the Council of
Ministers to amend Regulation 19/65 which allows the Commission to
implement Article 81(3), a step which the Commission chose to avoid in its
rush to have the new rules in place by May 2004.47 Against the backdrop of
the modernization experiment, it is unfortunate that multiparty agreements
will be excluded from the revised block exemption safe harbor. However,
in assessing multiparty agreements the Commission states that it will apply
the principles set out in the Draft TTBE by analogy.4 8
45 Id. at art. 4(2)(c).
46 Id. at art. 2.
47 Council Regulation 19/65 (EEC) of 2 March 1965 on the Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1965 O.J. (L 36)
533.
48 Draft Guidelines, supra note 5, at para. 33.
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3. Subcontracting
Paragraphs 37-40 of the Draft Guidelines purport to replace the
Commission's 1979 Notice on Subcontracting. 49 The Commission is likely
to abandon this approach and instead complement the 1979 Notice since che
latter covers situations outside the scope of the Draft TTBE such as
subcontracting involving only the transfer of equipment.
In assessing subcontracting agreements in the future, it will be
necessary to look at the Draft Guidelines, the specialization block
exemption 50 and the Commission's vertical and horizontal guidelines, as
well as the 1979 Notice. 5' In light of the significance of outsourcing in
today's economy, it would be helpful for the Commission to consolidate its
approach to subcontracting in one policy document.
4. Technology Pools
Technology pools, whereby two or more parties combine technologies
in a package which is licensed to members of the pool and to third parties,
are not covered by the Draft TTBE, but are discussed in some detail in the
Draft Guidelines. Although the pool itself is outside the scope of the draft
regulation, because its main aim is not the manufacture of contract
products, individual licenses granted by the pool to third party licensees are
covered.
In short, the Commission indicates that the pooling of complementary
technologies will be viewed more favorably than the pooling of
technological substitutes (which is viewed as collective tying and is
therefore unlikely to be exempted).
The Commission also distinguishes between essential and non-
essential technologies. The pooling of essential technologies is likely to fall
outside the scope of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty in the first place. The
inclusion of non-essential technologies will bring a pool within Article
81(1) of the EC Treaty and will be assessed on its merits. In this respect,
the Draft Guidelines go further than Commission case law to date end
introduce welcome flexibility. In its assessment of such agreements, the
Commission will examine, inter alia, how the pool is structured, whether
safeguards exist to prevent the exchange of sensitive pricing and output
data, whether an independent dispute resolution mechanism is in place, etc.
49 Commission Notice concerning the assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in
relation of Article 81 (1) of the Treaty, 1979 O.J. (C 1) 2.
5o Commission Regulation (EC) 2685/2000 of 21 November 2000_on the Application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304) 3.
51 Paragraph 33 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints; Draft Guidelines, supra note 5, at
para. 81.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:601 (2004)
5. The Transitional Period
Article 9(2) of the Draft TTBE envisages that agreements which
qualify under the current TTBE, which was to have remained in force until
March 31, 2006, will benefit from transitional relief only until October 31,
2005.2 Given the drastic changes envisioned in the approach to agreements
between competitors,5 3 it has been argued that this transitional period
undermines legal certainty by shortening an existing block exemption.
Restrictions which have to date been covered by the current TTBE would,
upon expiration of the proposed transition period, qualify as hardcore
restraints under the new proposal. As of January 2004, it appears that the
Commission is willing to extend the transition period to March 31, 2006.
V. RESTRAINTS OUTSIDE THE SAFE HARBOR TO BE INDIVIDUALLY
ASSESSED UNDER ARTICLE 8 1(3)
A. Grant-backs, Assignment Obligations and No-Challenge clauses (Draft
TTBE, Article 5(1))
Article 5(1) of the Draft TTBE takes outside the scope of the block
exemption safe harbor:
(i) a requirement on the licensee to exclusively license its
severable improvements to the licensor;
(ii) a requirement on the licensee to assign improvements to the
licensor; and
(iii)a no-challenge clause without prejudice to the licensor's right
to terminate the license in the event the licensee challenges the
validity of the licensed intellectual property rights.54
Under the current TTBE, grant-back provisions are permissible only if
they are non-exclusive and reciprocal. Under the new proposal, non-
reciprocal grant back obligations, whether imposed on the licensee or
licensor would be covered by the Draft TTBE, for as long as the grant-back
is non-exclusive.
With respect to the assignment of improvements 55 and no-challenge
clauses,56 under the current TTBE both clauses are black listed hardcore
restraints, the inclusion of which renders the block exemption inapplicable
to the entire agreement. The new proposal is welcome in that it will take
these restraints outside the scope of the block exemption, however, without
affecting the validity of the remainder of the agreement. As of January
52 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 9(2).
" See infra § IV(C)(1).
54 Draft TTBE, supra note 5, at art. 5(1).
" Id. at art. 5(l)(b).
56 Id. at art. 5(2)(c).
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2004, the Commission seems willing to limit the scope of Article 5(1)(b) so
as to include in the safe harbor a requirement on the licensee to assign non-
severable improvements to the licensor. As under the current regime, a
clause enabling the licensor to terminate the agreement if the licensee
challenges the licensed IP rights would be covered by the Draft TTBE.
B. Restraints on Exploitation of Existing Technologies and on Carrying
out of R&D between Non-Competitors (Draft TTBE, Article 5(3))
By virtue of Article 4(l)(d) of the Draft TTBE, it is prohibited, in
agreements between competitors, to restrict the licensee's ability to exploit
its own technology or the restriction of the ability of either party to carry
out independent R&D unless it is "indispensable" to prevent the disclosure
of licensed know-how to third parties.57 However, by virtue of Article 5(3),
in agreements between non-competitors, the inclusion of these restraints
does not bring the entire agreement outside the scope of the block
exemption but will require them to be analyzed in light of the Article 81(3)
exemption criteria.
VI. CONCLUSION
In line with the Commission's aim of "modernizing" the block
exemption regulations in preparation for the decentralized enforcement
system created by Regulation 1/2003, a revised TTBE will provide for an
"umbrella style" exemption approach according to which, within certain
market share thresholds, all restrictive agreements will be allowed unless
expressly prohibited. Above the market share thresholds, there is no
presumption that an agreement is illegal: the burden of proof that the
agreement falls within Article 81(1) falls on the competition authority or
plaintiff that seeks to challenge its validity.
Central to the Commission's reform proposals is the sensible
distinction between agreements concluded between competitors and
agreements concluded between non-competitors. However, the draft texts
of October 2003 created the distinct impression that the Commission
inherently mistrusts many licensing relationships as thinly disguised market
sharing arrangements or as abuses of the underlying patent system. It erred
too far on the side of caution in trying to draw a line between the strict
minimum necessary to encourage licensors to disseminate their technology
and the perceived need to protect intra-technology competition and ensure
that licensees become potential sources of innovation. For agreements
between competitors, the Draft TTBE's stricter rules with respect to
territorial and field of use restraints would have significant implications for
a great many existing contracts. In other respects, the new proposals would,
17 id. at art. 4(1)(d).
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however, introduce greater flexibility: software agreements would be
covered, the arbitrary duration limits on the grant of exclusivity would be
removed, tying obligations and non-compete obligations would be
exempted within the respective market share thresholds, reciprocal grant-
back obligations would no longer be required, and welcome guidance is
provided on important licensing phenomena such as technology pools.
As the Commission indicated in January 2004, the Commission hopes
to maintain its readiness to significantly amend its proposals if the new
package is to have the desired effect of providing sufficient legal certainty
to promote the dissemination of technology in the European Union.
